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What are the equilibrium features of a ﬁnancial market where a sizeable propor-
tion of traders face reputational concerns? This question is central to our under-
standing of ﬁnancial markets, which are increasingly dominated by institutional
investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio management that cap-
tures key features of the US mutual fund industry and embed it in an asset pricing
framework. We thus provide a formal model of ﬁnancial equilibrium with career
concerned agents. Fund managers differ in their ability to understand market
fundamentals, and in every period investors choose a fund. In equilibrium, the
presence of career concerns induces uninformed fund managers to churn, i.e., to
engage in trading even when they face a negative expected return. Churners act
as noise traders and enhance the level of trading volume. The equilibrium rela-
tionship between fund return and net fund ﬂows displays a skewed shape that is
consistent with stylized facts. The robustness of our core results is probed from
several angles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a substantial increase in the institutional ownership of corporate equity
around the world in recent decades. On the New York Stock Exchange, for example, the
percentageofoutstandingcorporateequityheldbyinstitutionalinvestorshasincreased
from 7.2% in 1950 to 49.8% in 2002 (NYSE 2003). For OECD countries as a whole, insti-
tutional ownership now accounts for around 30% of corporate equity (Nielsen 2003).
Institutional traders may be guided by incentives that are not fully captured by stan-
dard models in ﬁnance (Lakonishok et al. 1992).1 Consider, for example, the case of
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US mutual funds, which make up a signiﬁcant proportion of institutional investors in
equity markets.2 Because of SEC regulations, most mutual funds charge fees that are in-
dependent of performance.3 Their revenue depends only on the amount of assets that
investors choose to entrust to them. At the same time, there is a substantial amount of
empirical evidence that investors shift their money towards funds that have performed
well in the recent past creating a “ﬂow-performance” relationship (Ippolito 1992 and
ChevalierandEllison1997). Fundshaveimplicitincentivesto“impressinvestors”inthe
current period in order to retain their investor base and attract new business in future
periods. Indeed, Chevalier and Ellison present evidence that funds alter their behavior
inresponsetosuchimplicitincentives.4 Giventhesizeofthemutualfundindustry,such
behavior is likely to affect prices and quantities in ﬁnancial markets. In this paper, we
consider the theoretical implications of the situation just described. In particular, we
ask: What are the equilibrium features of a ﬁnancial market in which a sizeable propor-
tion of traders face implicit incentives of the kind that drive US mutual funds?
As a starting point, we draw upon the burgeoning theoretical literature on career
concernsforexperts(e.g.HolmströmandRicartiCosta1986,ScharfsteinandStein1990,
Prendergast and Stole 1996, and Ottaviani and Sørensen 2006). An expert is an agent
whose type determines his ability to understand the state of the world. This differs from
“classical career concerns” (Holmström 1999) in which the agent’s type determines his
ability to exert effort. Expert models are particularly suited to analyze agency relation-
ships in ﬁnancial setups, in which the key driver appears to be the ability to pick the
right portfolio rather than pure effort exertion. Some expert models have been used to
analyze precisely such settings. For example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) develop an
agency theoretic model in which experts mimic the decisions of other experts due to ca-
reer concerns. However, that paper, and other such applications, consider only partial
equilibrium analysis in which prices are ﬁxed.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a ﬁnancial equilibrium model in
which prices are determined endogenously by the behavior of experts with reputational
concerns.5 This enables us to examine the effects of career concerned behavior on ﬁ-
nancial market variables.6
In our model there are four classes of agents: investors who cannot trade directly,
fundmanagers whotradeonbehalfofinvestors, noisetraders whotradeforunmodelled
liquidity reasons, and uninformed traders who act as market makers. It is a dynamic
model: in every period the investors select among available fund managers. Fund man-
agers face career concerns, which are the driving force behind our results.7
2Around 37% of equity held by institutions in 2002 was held by mutual funds; this number does not
include state and private pension funds (NYSE 2003).
3See Elton et al. (2003) for details. Only 1.7% of US mutual funds charged incentive fees in 1999.
4Lakonishok et al. (1991) present evidence of related “window dressing” behavior by pension fund
managers.
5We survey the related literature on asset pricing and agency problems below.
6It also enables us to examine whether career concerns can persist in a setting where prices play both
informational and allocational roles.
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In the baseline model, the form of the payment from the investor to the fund man-
ager is exogenously given and places little or no weight on performance. As discussed
above, this assumption applies by and large to US mutual funds. This allows us to make
our main points in a simple, tractable model. Later in the paper we show that the results
are still valid in an environment with endogenous contracting.
There are two periods. In each period there is a market for a risky asset, which is
liquidated at the end of the period. In the beginning of the ﬁrst period, investors entrust
a fund manager with a sum of money. The fund manager trades on their behalf, and
at the end of the period the investors observe the return obtained by the manager. At
the beginning of the second period the investors can choose to retain the current fund
manager or to replace him with a new one. Again, the fund manager trades on behalf of
the investors.
Fund managers are characterized by their ability to observe market fundamentals.
A good fund manager is more likely to learn the liquidation value of the asset before the
asset is liquidated. In equilibrium investors can attempt to infer the ability of their fund
manager from the outcome of trading.
Therestofthemarketismadeofnoisetraderswhotradeforexogenousliquidityrea-
sons (see, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) and a large number of uninformed
traders who act as market makers. Market makers post bid and ask prices. As market
makers are rational, there may be an endogenous bid-ask spread to account for adverse
selection.
The main ﬁndings are as follows.
1. Without career concerns, fund managers trade if and only if they possess valu-
able private information. As a benchmark case, suppose that the fund manager
has no career concerns, because the decision to replace or retain him is exoge-
nous. Then we show that informed managers trade but uninformed managers do
not. Informed managers trade because they can make proﬁts in the presence of
noise traders. Such trade by informed managers leads to a strictly positive bid-
ask spread, which, in turn, implies that trading without information is a negative
expected utility gamble. Thus, uninformed managers do not trade.
2. With career concerns, young fund managers trade regardless of whether they pos-
sessinformationor not. If thedecisiontoreplaceorretainthefundmanager isen-
dogenous, there exists a churning equilibrium in which a young manager always
trades. If he is informed, he trades correctly. If not, he churns, that is, he buys or
sells at random. If an uninformed young manager does not churn, he signals his
lack of information and gets replaced in the following period.
3. Churning enhances trading volume. The trading volume is higher in the churning
equilibrium than it is in the equilibrium of the model without career concerns:
such as those documented by Chevalier and Ellison (1999). In our set-up, the fund manager and the fund
companyarethesameentity: thetermsfundmanagerandmutualfundcanbe(andare)usedinterchange-
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all young fund managers and all informed old managers engage in trading. The
effect on trading volume is highest when there are very few informed managers:
in such a market, trading volume is lowest in the case without career concerns
(because only informed managers trade), leading to the largest relative increase
due to churning. Below, we examine the existing literature and argue that this
ﬁnding contributes towards a potential solution to the “trade volume puzzle.”
4. The endogenous compensation function is skewed against average performers. In
the churning equilibrium, achieving an average return (as a result of non-trading)
is as bad as achieving a negative return (as a result of a wrong trade). Both out-
comes signal poor information and lead to the manager being replaced. Instead
a positive outcome ensures that the manager is kept. The endogenous incentive
structure is such the implicit compensation of an average performer is closer to
that of an under-performer than to that of an over-performer.
While our model is special, the intuition is general. If bad agents have less useful
private information than good agents, their expectations of fundamentals are less
likely to deviate from the market expectation (the technical conditions for this to
be true are examined in Section 3). Hence, bad agents are less likely to beneﬁt
by trading, and in equilibrium lack of trade must carry a reputational cost. This
in turn creates an incentive for fund managers to take excessive risk. An unin-
formed manager prefers randomizing over performance rather than getting stuck
with an average outcome. Both the shape of the implicit compensation function
and the risk-taking behavior are consistent with the ﬁndings of Chevalier and El-
lison (1997). Their empirical ﬂow-performance relationship displays convexity,
and, as a consequence, recently established funds face a measurable incentive to
increase the variance of performance.
It is useful to place the present contribution in the context of the literature on the
trade volume puzzle. Any attempt to model ﬁnancial trading faces the mighty obstacle
of no-trade theorems.8 Under general conditions, the arrival of new private informa-
tion cannot generate trade among rational traders. The intuition is related to Akerlof’s
lemons problem. A trader who shows willingness to buy (sell) a given asset signals that
he has private information indicating that the asset is worth more (less) than its mar-
ket price. In equilibrium, this adverse selection problem results in zero trading. To get
around the no-trade issue, the ﬁnance literature, beginning with Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), has assumed the presence of noise trading. Noise traders are agents who must
sell or buy because something has changed in their personal situation. For instance
they are compelled by unforeseen circumstances to generate or utilize liquidity (hence,
noise traders are sometimes referred to as liquidity traders) or they need to buy particu-
lar securities to hedge against new risks. The presence of noise traders reduces adverse
selection and allows for trade by informed speculators.
However, noise trading theories have come under increasing attack for their per-
ceivedinabilitytoexplaintheorderofmagnitudeofﬁnancialtrade. Whilenoconclusive
8See Brunnermeier (2000) for an overview of the topic and for further references.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 71
evidence is available, many scholars are reluctant to accept that the trading volumes
observed on modern stock markets (over $10 trillion in 2002 on the New York Stock
Exchange) can be explained by the kind of exogenous events that drive noise trading
(Glaser and Weber 2003). (De Bondt and Thaler 1995, p. 392) go as far as to say that the
high trade volume observed in ﬁnancial markets “is perhaps the single most embarrass-
ing fact to the standard ﬁnance paradigm”. One solution to the trading volume puzzle
is to abandon the rational paradigm, for instance by allowing for overconﬁdence (e.g.
Kyle and Wang 1997 and Glaser and Weber 2003). Our paper provides an alternative so-
lution. We show that the presence of implicit incentives similar to those faced by US
mutual funds can lead to excessive trading by institutions and thus enhance the volume
of trade in ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, the model yields testable implications, which
are discussed in the conclusion.
Our core results are derived in the simplest possible setting. We probe the robust-
ness of our conclusions by extending the analysis in several directions. First, we show
that any putative equilibria of our game in which churning does not occur must be per-
verse: intheseequilibria, investorsmustpunishmanagersforobtaininghighreturnson
their behalf.
Second, we extend our analysis to incorporate a richer information structure. We
show that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for churning to occur is that a good fund
managerismorelikelythanabadfundmanagertoreceiveasignalabouttheliquidation
value of the asset. If that mild condition is satisﬁed, there is a strict reputational cost of
not trading. In equilibrium, a fund manager who has received an uninformative signal
prefers churning to not trading.
Finally, we incorporate endogenous short-term contracts, which allow for payment
contingentoncurrentperformancebutnotpaymentcontingentonfutureperformance.
We show that, as long as the proportion of informed managers is small enough, the op-
timal contract is not contingent on performance and thus churning persists.
Our paper is closely linked to the pioneering work of Dow and Gorton (1997). They
embedamoralhazardproblembetweeninvestorsandtheirfundmanagersintoanasset
pricing model and show that under the optimal contract fund managers have an incen-
tive to trade even when they have no private information, that is, they churn. In their
model, some uninformed traders are motivated by the desire to hedge against risks that
arise with exogenous probability. In equilibrium, the presence of an agency problem
may generate a high trade volume even in the presence of a small hedging component.9
While Dow and Gorton consider a static model with complete contracts, we focus on a
dynamic model with incomplete contracts, which is perhaps a better representation of
the mutual fund industry. As a consequence, we are able to study phenomena of prac-
tical interest, such as the endogenous incentive structure faced by fund managers (the
equilibriumﬂow-performancerelationship)andtherelationshipbetweenchurningand
seniority. We are also able to show the optimality of non-contingent pay for fund man-
agement companies, which is a common feature of the mutual fund industry in the US
and elsewhere.
9For further discussion of Dow and Gorton’s results, see Bhattacharya (2002).72 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
In a related paper, Allen and Gorton (1993) present a model in which prices can di-
verge from fundamentals due to churning by portfolio managers. In their model, bad
fund managers buy bubble stocks at prices above their known liquidation value in the
hope of reselling them before they die—at even higher prices—to other bad fund man-
agers. Their behavior is the result of an option-like payoff structure under which proﬁts
are shared with managers but losses are not. Churning thus creates the possibility of
short-term speculative proﬁts. In contrast, in our setting, churning occurs under a ﬂat
fee structure due to reputational concerns over the life of the fund.
An earlier paper by Trueman (1988) considers a delegated portfolio management
model in which the fund manager’s ability is unknown. Compensation depends on per-
formance and on the posterior belief on the fund’s manager ability. Trueman shows that
there is a churning equilibrium in which uninformed fund managers trade. Our paper
differs in two respects. First, Trueman assumes that the fund manager’s future compen-
sation depends on his posterior in an exogenously given way. Instead in our model, fu-
ture compensation depends on the investor’s retention decision, which is endogenous.
Second, Trueman considers a partial equilibrium model (and therefore cannot discuss
trade volume) while we take into account the feedback that the fund manager’s trade
has on the asset market.
In a recent study of active management, Berk and Green (2004) present a model
with symmetric information, learning, and diminishing returns to fund size that repli-
cates several features of the data, including the ﬂow-performance relationship. Berk
and Green consider a partial equilibrium framework. Hence, unlike us, they do not fo-
cus on prices and volume. While our goals are different, our results overlap with theirs
inprovidinganalternativeexplanationfortheﬂow-performancerelationship(basedon
career concerns). It is worth noting that, in examining the ﬁnancial equilibrium impact
ofinstitutionaltrading,wedonotattempttomatchanotheraspectofthedata—thelack
of performance persistence—that is captured by Berk and Green. It would be interest-
ing,thoughbeyondthescopeofthecurrentexercise,toincorporatediminishingreturns
to scale (as in Berk and Green (2004)) in a general equilibrium framework (such as ours)
to match the data along a further dimension.
Finally, our paper bears a general connection to a number of recent papers examin-
ingtheassetpricingimplicationsofdelegatedportfoliomanagement,someofwhichwe
surveyhere. CuocoandKaniel(2001)showthatexogenouslyspeciﬁedperformancefees
can have signiﬁcant asset pricing implications. Symmetric and asymmetric fees induce
different effects. Dasgupta and Prat (2005) show that the presence of career concerns
can diminish the ability of a ﬁnancial market to aggregate information over time and
can lead to information cascades and systematic mispricing. Gümbel (2005) develops a
model in which agency problems arising out of delegated portfolio management lead to
short-termism by fund managers, which in turn can have implications on asset prices.
Vayanos (2003) considers the implications of delegation incentives on liquidity premia
in ﬁnancial markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section develops the
simplest model which is sufﬁcient to generate our main results. Section 3 extends the
baseline model in various directions. Section 4 concludes.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 73
2. THE BASELINE CASE
To present the essence of our results, we begin by discussing a simple baseline model.
The main assumptions are: (1) contracts are exogenously given, and (2) a good manager
has perfect information while a bad manager has no information. These assumptions
are made for analytical convenience and are relaxed in Section 3.
2.1 Model
Consider an economy with two periods, t = 1, 2. There is a single risk-neutral principal
(investor)andalargepoolofexanteidenticalrisk-neutralagents(fund-managers). One
of these is hired at random at t = 1 to trade for the principal. At the end of the period,
the principal mayretain the agent orhirea new one atrandom from the pool. The agent
can be of two types: θ ∈ {b,g} with probabilities 1−γ and γ respectively. The type of
any given agent is unknown to both the principal and the agent, and remains ﬁxed for
the duration of the game.
At each time period t, there is exactly one risky asset with liquidation value vt ∈
{0,1}; each value occurs with probability
1
2. The payoff vt is realized at the end of each
period and is independent across periods. The agent’s type θ and the asset payoff vt are
independent.10
In each period t, the fund manager submits a market order at ∈ A = {0,;,1}, where
0 stands for “sell one unit at highest available price”, 1 stands for “buy one unit at lowest
available price”, and ;, the empty set, represents lack of activity.
At the end of each period, the principal and the market can observe the net return
obtained by the agent. After such observation, the principal decides whether to retain
or ﬁre the fund manager. The retention decision of the investor is observed by the mar-
ket.11
In each period, there are N ≥ 1 “noise traders” who trade for liquidity reasons unre-
lated to the value of the asset. Each such trader enters (independently of each other and
of asset value and manager type) with probability η ∈ (0,1) and buys or sells one unit of
the asset available in the period with equal probability.
There are a large number M of risk-neutral uninformed rational traders who act as
market makers.12 In any period, market makers can each buy or sell at most one unit of
the asset available in that period. The action of each market maker consists of setting













for at = 0.
The fund manager and any noise trader is free to trade with any market maker, and,
10While we thus consider only one short-term asset per period, the spirit of our arguments would extend
also to the case where there are multiple long term assets, as long as the identities of particular assets re-
garding which informedmanagers have private informationchangeover time, and if returnsand turnovers
are observable. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
11Theprincipalobservesthereturnbutnottheportfoliochoiceortheliquidationvalue. Aswillbeappar-
ent later, this assumption is immaterial to our results. This property is a feature of the simple setting used
here. See Prat (2005) for a more general analysis of the effect of the structure of the principal’s information
on the agent’s behavior.
12We assume that M N.74 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
when indifferent between them, chooses one at random. Market makers are thus sub-
ject to Bertrand competition (as is now standard in the literature, following Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985)) and each sets prices equal to the expected value of the
asset conditional on the order.
The fund manager and noise traders submit their orders to the market makers si-
multaneously.13 Within a period, a given market maker observes only orders that arrive
to him. Trades are anonymous: a market maker who receives an order does not know
whether it comes from the fund manager or from a noise trader.14
The fund manager’s information structure is common to both periods and depends
on the fund manager’s type. In each period t, a good fund manager receives a signal
conveying the true liquidation value vt, while a bad fund manager receives no signal.
The signal st can take three values, 0, 1, and ;, and it is determined as follows:
st (θ,vt)=
(
vt if θ = g
; if θ =b.
In the present setup, s reveals θ. When the fund manager learns his signal he also learns
his type. The investor does not observe either the signal or the type.







0 if at =;
vt −pA
t if at =1
p B
t −vt if at =0.
Write a time-t mixed strategy for an agent as the mapping at :S →∆A.
In this baseline version of the model, the contractual arrangement between the in-
vestorandthefundmanagerisexogenouslydetermined. Notethatweabstractthrough-
out from agency problems that may arise within fund management companies. Thus,
mutual fund managers can be identiﬁed with mutual funds companies. Accordingly, we
model payoffs to managers along the lines of the fees charged by mutual fund compa-
nies. Given return χt, the payment from the investor to the manager is
πt =αχt +β,
where α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈ (0,∞). In most of the results of the present section we focus on
the case α → 0. However, the fact that α > 0 guarantees that when career concerns are
absent, the interests of the fund manager are aligned with those of the investor.
13Since M  N, we neglect the possibility that a noise trader and the fund manager or two noise traders
give their orders to the same market maker.
14We have in mind a large OTC market, such as the NASDAQ, that has many dealers who make markets
simultaneously. There is no central order book, and thus one dealer is typically unaware of contemporane-
ous orders that arrive to other dealers.
This formulation simpliﬁes the analysis substantially without being essential to our results. Our results
would also hold in a single dealer market as long as there were sufﬁciently many trading periods for each
asset. See Dasgupta and Prat (2005) for an analysis of such a market.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 75
For simplicity there is no discounting. The investor’s payoff is given by χ1−π1+χ2−
π2. The fund manager’s payoff is π1 +π2.
It is clear that if α and β were very large (for example, if α → 1 and β > 0), it would
never be in the investor’s interest to employ a fund manager. To keep the problem inter-






We show below that this condition is sufﬁcient to guarantee that the investor wants to
hire the manager rather than to stay out of the market. Furthermore, we later show that
the optimal short-term contract between the investor and the fund manager satisﬁes
this condition.
To summarize, the timing is as follows.
t =1 – The fund manager learns s1 and chooses a1.
– Traders observe a1 and set prices.
– The investor and the market observes the net return obtained by the man-
ager; v1 is revealed to the market; payments to the fund manager are made.
t =2 – The investor retains the incumbent or hires the challenger. The investor’s
action is observed by the market.15
– The fund manager learns s2 and chooses a2.
– Traders observe a2 and set prices.
– Theinvestorandthemarketobservethenetreturnobtainedbythemanager;
v2 is revealed to the market; payments to the fund manager are made.
2.2 No churning without career concerns
We show below that the presence of career concerns can induce bad fund managers
to trade without information, that is, to churn. Before doing so, however, we establish
a benchmark case without career concerns, in order to reassure readers that our core
results are indeed due to the presence of implicit incentives and not to other features of
our dynamic model.
Career concerns arise when the fund manager knows that his chance of being re-
placeddependsonhisbehavior. Toeliminatetheimplicitincentivecomponent,assume
that the probability that the ﬁrst period fund manager is retained is exogenously given
by r ∈[0,1] and is stochastically independent from any other variable in the model.
PROPOSITION 1. Foranyexogenousr ∈[0,1],fundmanagerstradeifandonlyiftheyhave
private information. That is, only good managers trade.
15We are thus assuming that the investor and the market share the same beliefs about the fund manager
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The proof of this result, and that of all results other than the main result (Proposi-
tion 2), are detailed in the appendix. In the absence of career concerns, fund managers
behave optimally. Because of the presence of noise traders, the market is never fully ef-
ﬁcient. Thus, it is optimal for managers with perfect private information to trade. Mar-
ket makers realize that they may face an informed fund manager and thus set a strictly
positive bid-ask spread. This, in turn, implies that uninformed fund managers lose in
expectation when they trade because of adverse selection. Thus, they do not trade.
2.3 Churning with career concerns
We now return to the initial model and let the retention choice be made by the investor.
What follows is our core result on the existence and characterization of the churning
equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2. If α is small enough,16 there exists an equilibrium in which:
(i) The investor retains the fund manager at t = 2 if he trades correctly at t = 1 and
replaces him with a new fund manager if he trades incorrectly or does not trade.
(ii) A good fund manager always trades. A bad fund manager churns if t =1 and does
not trade if t =2. Formally,










































if ﬁrst period manager was retained
γ otherwise.




2 and p B
2 <
1
2. A good fund manager with signal s = 1 is strictly better off buying
because 1−pA
2 >0. A good fund manager with s =0 is better off selling because p B
2 >0.
16In particular, we require that α≤(1+Nη)β/γ.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 77
Investor’s belief: Given the price structure, only three possible ﬁrst-period realiza-



















and the one corresponding to no trade: χ1 =0.
In the present equilibrium only the former two are observed. The requirement that
investors beliefs are consistent with equilibrium play implies that
e γ(χ1)=Pr
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∈[0,1] if χ1 =0.
The return χ1 = 0, which corresponds to the action a = ;, is off the equilibrium path at
t =1. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes no restriction. We choose to set17
Pr
 
θ = g |χ1 =0

=0.
Investor’s retaining strategy: In the second period, managers produce a strictly posi-
tive return if and only if they are of the good type. At the beginning of period t =2, given







which is increasing in e γ. Thus, the investor should retain the fund manager at t = 2 if
and only if
e γ(χ1)≥γ,
that is, if and only if the manager produces a positive return at t =1.
Good fund manager’s strategy at t = 1: A good fund manager who plays a = s pro-
duces net return 1−pA
1 =
1
















It is clear that that πg (a =s) is higher than the payoff (β) that the fund manager gets if
he plays a =; and the payoff (<β) the manager gets if he plays a =1−s.
17The proof works also with any Pr
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Bad fund manager’s strategy at t = 1: A bad fund manager who does not trade gen-
erates a zero net return in t =1 and is not retained. Therefore, his total payoff is
πb (a =;)=β.
If instead the bad manager plays either a = 1 or a = 0 in t = 1, he is successful with
probability
1






































Traders’ pricing strategy: At t =1, market makers know that a buy order can be from
aninformedmanager(withprobabilityγ/(1+Nη)),anuninformedmanagerengagedin
churning (with probability (1−γ)/(1+Nη)), or a noise trader (with probability Nη/(1+











































or from informed managers. If a bad type of manager gets retained in error, he does not
trade. Market makers share the investor’s beliefs about the probability that the fund







if ﬁrst period manager is retained
γ otherwise.
18The qualitative properties of our results do not depend on whether market makers share the investor’s
beliefs. If, instead, they did not observe the returns of the period 1 manager and whether the investor
retains the manager, then e γ would simply be equal to the ex ante probability of a good manager in the
second period, γ+
1
2(1−γ)γ, given the equilibrium.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 79































It is easy to see that delegation to a fund manager is optimal for the investor. The
calculations above show that the expected return produced at t = 1 by a good manager
is
1
2(1−γ+Nη)/(1+Nη) and by a bad manager is −
1
2γ/(1+Nη). Thus the return to the
investor from delegating to the fund manager is (1−α)
1
2γNη/(1+Nη)−β. Therefore,
if α and β satisfy condition (1), then delegation at t = 1 is optimal for the investor. It is
clear that the condition required for delegation to be beneﬁcial to the investor at t =2 is
weakerthancondition(1), andthusdelegationisalsobeneﬁcialfortheinvestoratt =2.
Proposition 2 identiﬁes a churning equilibrium. All ﬁrst-period fund managers
trade. The good ones make correct trades by following their private information. The
bad ones randomize between buying and selling.
The investor realizes that a successful trade may come from a lucky churner. Still,
she knows that a good manager is more likely to be right and she revises her posterior
upwards if she observes a successful trade. She knows also that a wrong trade can come
only from a bad manager, and she believes that no-trade (an off-equilibrium event) is
more likely to come from a bad manager. Given this set of beliefs, the investor retains
the ﬁrst-period manager if and only if he has traded successfully.
A good manager makes positive returns in both periods. He knows the liquidation
value and he buys or sells at prices that are strictly between 0 and 1. He is also certain to
be retained.
A bad manager faces a depressing choice between churning and non-trading. If he
churns, he makes negative expected return −
1
2γ/(1 + Nη) but has a 50% of being re-
tained. If he does not trade, he makes a zero return and is ﬁred for sure. If the direct-
stake parameter α is low enough, the bad manager prefers to churn.
We now discuss in detail two important implications of Proposition 2: the effect of
churning on trading volume and the equilibrium incentives faced by fund managers.
2.4 The impact of churning on trading volume
Trading volume is the expected number of assets traded on average in the two periods
of our model. It is instructive to compute the trading volumes generated by the model
in the absence and presence of career concerns. This allows us to measure the extent to
which career concerns enhance trading volume in ﬁnancial markets, and enables us to
examine comparative statics.
In the model without career concerns, the two periods are identical. In each period,
there is a probability γ that a manager will possess private information and trade based
on it. In addition, in each period, N noise traders each trade with probability η. Thus,80 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)







In the presence of career concerns, in the ﬁrst period, fund managers trade with and
without information. In the second period, however, only informed fund managers
trade. The ex ante probability that the second-period fund manager is good is equal
to the probability that the manager is good in t =1 (because he is retained for sure) plus




































We can now state:
COROLLARY 1. The proportionate increasein trading volume duetothe presence ofcareer










As the proportion of talented fund managers gets small, the presence of career concerns
leads to larger percentage increases in trading volume.
It is exactly when there are many potential churners in the market that churning
leadstothegreatestincreaseintradevolume. Furthermore,weshowbelowthatitisalso
exactly when there are very few talented fund managers in the market that the optimal
contract is not contingent on performance (α=0), thus creating the conditions ideal for
churning.
Note that the increase in trading volume due to career concerns is driven by two




selection. To isolate the ﬁrst effect (the pure churning effect), one could, instead, focus
only on the ﬁrst period, when the relevant ratio would be (1−γ)/(γ+Nη), which has
very similar properties to the ratio above.
2.4.1 Relaxing the optimal delegation condition: can churning substitute for noise trade?
In the analysis so far, we have always insisted that investors delegate to fund managers
onlyifsuchdelegationisoptimalforthem. Theoptimaldelegationcondition(1)issufﬁ-
cienttoguaranteethis. Inpractice, however, thereissubstantialempiricalevidencethat




delegated funds in index funds, and Europeans put just 2% (Economist 2003). It seems
natural, therefore, to explore the predictions of our model when we ignore the optimal
delegation condition (1). We examine one such case below.
Holding ﬁxed α > 0 and β > 0, we let Nη → 0. This clearly violates condition (1):
As noise trade vanishes, there is no abnormal proﬁt to be made by trading. Suppose
our investor behaved as retail investors in the real world seem to do, i.e., she still chose
to delegate to an active fund manager. In this case notice that pA
2 → 1 and p B
2 → 0, so
that pA
2 −p B
2 → 1, so that the market becomes extremely illiquid in the second period,
when career concerns are absent. However, period 1 prices behave differently: pA
1 →
1
2(1+γ) and p B
1 →
1
2(1−γ), so that pA
1 −p B
1 →γ<1, and the market thus remains liquid.
This is because at t = 1 churners replace genuine noise traders and provide liquidity
to the market by being willing to take losses in expectation to informed managers. The
(irrational) investor effectively ﬁnances this noise trade by taking losses in expectation
via delegation to fund managers.







grows without bound as γ gets small. Thus, if investors have a behavioral bias towards
delegating to active fund managers, the volume impact of churning can be arbitrar-
ily large. The existence of one anomaly—retail overinvestment in actively managed
funds—aids our efforts to resolve another anomaly—the trade volume puzzle—via the
career concerns of fund managers.
In the remainder of the paper, however, we return to the baseline, fully-rational set-
up, and insist that the optimal delegation condition (1) holds. We now proceed to exam-
ine another important property of the baseline model.
2.5 Asymmetric ﬂow-performance relationship
A further consequence of Proposition 2 is that the implicit incentives of young fund
managers are skewed. The reputational reward for good performance is higher in ab-
solute terms than the reputational cost of bad performance. The existence of such a
ﬂow-performance relationship has been documented empirically by Chevalier and Elli-
son (1997). In a seminal empirical study of a large sample of income and growth funds
from1982to1992, theyﬁndthatfundcompaniesfaceanasymmetricﬂow-performance
relationship. Funds with better past performance receive larger net in-ﬂows. However,
starting from average performance, the absolute effect of an increase in performance is
greater than the absolute effect of a decrease of the same size. This form of convexity is
much more evident for young funds. As a consequence, Chevalier and Ellison ﬁnd also
that young funds face incentives for excessive risk taking.
Equilibrium behavior in our model generates a similar, albeit more stylized, picture.
A fund manager who trades successfully (i.e. generates a positive return) has an invest-
ment in-ﬂow of zero. A fund manager who makes either a wrong trade (negative return)
ornotrade(averagereturn)hasaninvestmentin-ﬂowof−1. Thistranslatesintoskewed82 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
implicit incentives.19 To ﬁx ideas, let the explicit incentive component go to zero: α→0.





β if χ1 <0
β if χ1 =0
2β if χ1 >0.
As in Chevalier and Ellison, our young fund manager may have an incentive to increase
the variability of the ﬁrst-period return. If he is uninformed, he prefers a lottery over χ1,
which he achieves by churning, rather than χ1 = 0 for sure, which he could obtain by
not trading.
The intuition behind the asymmetry of the ﬂow-performance relationship goes be-
yond our simple set-up. In any model of career concerns for experts, the value of an
expert must depend on his ability to obtain information that is not publicly available
(see Zitzewitz 2001). If the expert is a fund manager, his usefulness corresponds to his
ability to form an opinion that differs from the market opinion. This leads a manager
to identify assets that are over- or under-priced. A better manager holds a portfolio that
is farther away from the market portfolio and, as consequence, generates a return that
is less correlated to the market return (but on average higher). Such a manager should
garner reputational rewards. Conversely, a fund manager who systematically tracks the
market must have limited private information and should be less sought after by ratio-
nal investors. In equilibrium, managers who obtain returns that are close to the market
return must face some reputational cost.
3. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
It is important to probe the robustness of the ﬁndings of the previous section. In this
section, we discuss the robustness of churning and endogenous contracts.
3.1 How robust is churning?
The core analysis focused on one particular equilibrium (the churning equilibrium)
given one particular information structure (good agents know everything, bad agents
know nothing). We now show that the churning equilibrium is the most plausible one
and that our results do not depend on the particular information structure we chose for
expositional purposes.
In order to abstract from pathological equilibria supported by carefully chosen out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, we carry out both of these exercises under the assumption that
an arbitrarily small proportion µ of managers are “naive”: These traders always choose
a = s. This implies that a small proportion of managers who receive signal s = ; do
19Two potential criticisms of our ﬂow-performance relationship are that it depends on the speciﬁc in-
formation structure used in the baseline model and that non-trading is an off-equilibrium event. Both
criticisms are addressed in Section 3.1.2, where we show the equilibrium of the baseline model arises in
settings with richer information structures and where no-trade is not an off-equilibrium event. Thus, the
asymmetric ﬂow-performance relationship persists.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 83
not trade. Thus, no-trade is no longer an off-equilibrium event. All other features of the
baseline model are as before.
3.1.1 Non-churning equilibria While churning need not be an essential property of
all equilibria of our baseline game, we shall show here that equilibria without churn-
ing must be “peculiar”: in these equilibria, over some ranges of returns, investors must
punish a manager for doing well. To be precise, denote the equilibrium retention prob-
abilities used by the investor by r(1),r(0), and r(−1) for the the cases where the manager
generates positive, zero, and negative returns respectively. Now we can state:
PROPOSITION 3. When α is sufﬁciently small, in any equilibrium in which managers do
not churn, it cannot be the case that r(1)≥r(0)≥r(−1).
If r(1)≥r(0)≥r(−1), it is clear that informed fund managers would trade according
to their signals. Then it must be the case that r(0) = 0.20 In addition, for the investor’s
strategy to be optimal, it must be the case that r(1) > 0. Thus, r(1) > r(0) = r(−1) = 0.
But then it follows that r(0) <
1
2[r(1) + r(−1)], and then (for small α) the uninformed
manager will churn.
The relative values of the equilibrium retention probabilities determine the slope of
the ﬂow-performance relationship discussed above. The interpretation of this result is
that any equilibrium where fund managers’ strategies are different from those identi-
ﬁed in Proposition 2 must be characterized by a ﬂow-performance relationship that is
strictly decreasing over some range. In other words, fund managers must be explicitly
punished for doing better. This is at odds with empirical ﬁndings.
3.1.2 A more general information structure The core result was obtained under the as-
sumption that the agent has an extremely simple information structure: a good agent
receives a perfectly informative signal, a bad agent receives no signal. We now general-
ize the information structure to allow a good agent to also receive no signal and a bad
agent to also receive an informative signal.





ρθ if s =v
1−ρθ −τθ if s =;
τθ if s =1−v,
where ρg, τg, ρb, and τb are parameters with values in the interval [0,1] such that ρg +
τg ≤ 1 and ρb +τb ≤ 1. The information structure is based on the implicit assumption
that the signal is symmetric in v = 1 and v = 0. Our core results were obtained under
the assumption that ρg = 1 and τg = ρb = τb = 0. The agent does not observe his own
type θ.
We assume that the signal is useful, in the sense that it provides some information
on the valuation v (even for a bad agent). Moreover, a good agent gets a more useful
20This is because beliefs are no longer arbitrary in the presence of a small measure of naive managers.84 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
signal than a bad agent:
1≥ρg >ρb >τb >τg ≥0. (2)
We now identify an important condition that implies that receiving informative sig-
nals is “good news” about a manager:
Pr
 




θ = g |s =;

. (3)
Stated in terms of primitives, this is equivalent to ρg +τg >ρb +τb. We now show that
this condition is necessary and sufﬁcient for churning.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose ρg +τg 6=ρb +τb. When α is sufﬁciently small:
(i) There exists a churning equilibrium in which










if and only if ρg +τg >ρb +τb.
(ii) Further, when ρg +τg > ρb +τb, there exists no equilibrium in which the agent
follows his signal in both periods: at (s)=s for t =1,2 and all s.
If inequality (3) is satisﬁed, there cannot exist a equilibrium in which the fund man-
ager follows his signal. The condition requires that observing an informative signal is
better news for the manager’s type than observing an uninformative signal: a good ex-
pert is more likely than a bad expert to get some kind of information, however ﬂawed,
rather than no information at all. If this condition is satisﬁed and the fund manager
follows his signal, then not trading is bad news about the manager’s type. The investor
should ﬁre a non-trader. If explicit incentives are not too large, an uninformed fund
manager would then prefer to churn and there exists no equilibrium in which the man-
ager follows his signal.
While we are thus able to substantially generalize the information structure used
in the baseline model, it is clear that several formulations are excluded. For exam-
ple, an information system in which bad managers always receive (imprecise) informa-
tion (ρb = τb =
1
2) but good managers sometimes receive very precise information and
sometimes receive no information at all (ρg =
2
3, τg =0) violates condition (3) (because
ρg + τg =
2
3 < ρb + τb = 1) and is excluded from our analysis. Such an information
structure would not support churning. In such a setting, the receipt of a signal serves as
evidence that a fund manager is of low quality.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 85
3.2 Endogenous contracts
The baseline model postulates exogenously given linear contracts. We now remove this
assumption and consider endogenous contracting between the investor and the fund
manager(s). We assume that the investor has all the bargaining power: he makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the fund manager. For simplicity, we also normalize the fund man-
ager’s participation constraint to zero.
To keep the problem interesting, we assume also that the fund manager must re-
ceive a minimum non-negative payment w if he is employed (for every period he is em-
ployed). If this were not the case, the investor would just offer a zero payment in both
periods and the fund manager would be entirely indifferent (and therefore he might as
well behave optimally). Since w > 0, we can disregard the fund manager’s participation
constraint.
Finally, werestrictattentiontoshort-termcontracts,whichseemtobemoreappeal-
ing for ﬁnancial settings.21 We show that the results of the baseline model are still valid.
There are two short-lived investors. Investor 1 offers a contract b1 to the fund man-
ager in the beginning of the ﬁrst-period and receives payoff χ1 −π1. The payment be-
tween investor 1 and the manager may depend on all the observables at t = 1 (but can-
not depend on what happens in t =2). Investor 2 is born in the beginning of the second
period and observes the return obtained by the manager in the previous period. She
then chooses between the incumbent manager and the challenger, and selects a con-
tract b2. We can then write a contract as a triple (corresponding to positive, negative,
and zero net returns respectively):
bt =(bt (success),bt (failure),bt (no trade)),
under the constraint—discussed above—that all three values are not below w. The time
line is:
t =1 – Investor 1 speciﬁes contract b1; the contract is observed by the market.
– The fund manager learns s1 and chooses a1.
– Traders observe a1 and set prices.
– Investor 1 and the market observes the net return; v1 is revealed to the mar-
ket; payments to the fund manager are made.
t =2 – Investor 2 observes the net ﬁrst period return. She retains the incumbent or
hires the challenger. She speciﬁes contract b2; the investor’s action and the
contract are observed by the market.
– The fund manager learns s2 and chooses a2.
– Traders observe a2 and set prices.
– Investor 2 and the market observes the net second period return; v2 is re-
vealed to the market. Payments to the fund manager are made.
21When long-term contracting is allowed, the existence of churning under the optimal contract depends
on parameter values, and no clear result emerges.86 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Weshowthat,aslongastheproportionofgoodmanagersissmallenough,andthere
is sufﬁcient amounts of noise trade, there exists an equilibrium that is identical to the
churning equilibrium that we found in the baseline model:
PROPOSITION 5. For any w > 0, if the proportion of good managers γ is low enough and
there is a sufﬁcient amount of noise trade, there exists a churning equilibrium in which:22
(i) Investor 1 hires a fund manager and selects a ﬂat contract b1 =(w,w,w).
(ii) Investor 2 retains the fund manager if and only if he traded successfully. Otherwise,
she hires a new manager. In either case, the investor selects a ﬂat contract for her
fund manager b2 =(w,w,w).
(iii) A good fund manager always trades. A bad fund manager churns if t =1 and does
not trade if t =2.
(iv) Traders set prices as in Proposition 2.
Even with endogenous contracting, the churning equilibrium of Proposition 2 is still
an equilibrium if: (i) only short-term contracts are possible; and (ii) the proportion of
good managers is low. Such an equilibrium has the same high levels of trading volume
identiﬁed in Section 2.4.
Trading by good managers beneﬁts the ﬁrst period investor, but churning by bad
managers hurts her. The investor can eradicate churning by offering an appropriate
contract. The beneﬁt of churning to a bad manager is given by a 50% chance of being
hired again in the next period:
1









γ+Nη ≤ w, the costs of paying
for non-trading outweighs the beneﬁts, and the investor prefers to offer a ﬂat contract.
Holding ﬁxed the amount of noise trading, this condition implies that as long as the
proportion of good managers is small enough, it is optimal for the investor to offer a ﬂat
contract.
The damage of churning per churner on investor 1 is lowest when the proportion of
good types γ is low because the bid-ask spread is narrow. Churning is least costly when
there are many churners. Therefore, if γ is low enough, the beneﬁt of stopping churning
is lower than the cost of reimbursing the bad manager for the lost career opportunity.
At a deeper level, the result may also be understood in terms of inefﬁciencies gen-
erated by bilateral contracting in an environment with more than two agents. Churning
increases the probability that the fund manager is retained in the second period. This
creates an additional rent to the incumbent which in part is paid for by investor 2 (who
cannottellforcertainbetweenagoodandabadincumbent)andbythechallenger(who




γ+Nη ≤w and Nη>2−γ.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 87
is hired with a lower probability).23 As investor 1 and the incumbent do not internalize
the cost that churning imposes on the other two parties, they ﬁnd it optimal to sign a
contract that does not prevent churning. That is why full bilateral contracting can still
lead to socially inefﬁcient outcomes.
When we reduce the proportion of informed traders holding ﬁxed the minimum fee
that must be paid to fund managers, it is natural to wonder whether delegation is still
optimal for investors. The proof in the appendix shows that this is indeed the case as
long as Nη > 2−γ, that is, as long as there is enough noise trade. The presence of such
noise trade creates sufﬁcient opportunities to make positive proﬁts from trading, thus
making delegation via uncontingent contracts optimal even when bad managers churn
and good managers are rare.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the equilibrium features of a ﬁnancial market in which a
non-negligible share of the market participants are fund managers who face career con-
cerns. These features differ markedly from the features of a standard market: prices are
lessinformativeandthereismoretrade. Uninformedfundmanagerengageinchurning
and in equilibrium they behave as if they were noise traders.
While we have examined several extensions of our model, many interesting avenues
of research remain unexplored. First, it would be interesting to enlarge the set of assets
and trades to make the analysis more comparable to standard ﬁnancial models such as
CAPM. It would also be important to introduce an element of risk-aversion for both in-
vestors and fund managers. Second, our results were derived in a static trading game.
Each security lasts for one period only and trade occurs at one speciﬁed instant. One
should consider a richer setting in which both trading activity and career concerns dis-
play their effects over time. Finally, as we discussed in the introduction, the present
model may contribute towards a solution to the trade volume puzzle. But then one
should ask how the career concerns explanation fares compared to the over-conﬁdence
explanation (Kyle and Wang 1997).
To conclude, we brieﬂy consider some of the empirical implications of our work.
Our theory suggests that increasing level of institutional ownership in ﬁnancial markets
should lead to higher volume over time. Our theory is, thus, falsiﬁable: if an increase
in the share of institutional trading is, ceteris paribus, accompanied by a decrease in
trading volume, we should reject the career concerns explanation. For the period 1955–
1988 on the NYSE, Dow and Gorton (1997) regress turnover on institutional ownership
andrealcommissionsandﬁndthatthecoefﬁcientoninstitutionalownershipispositive
and signiﬁcant. Our theory also suggests a cross-sectional implication: stocks with high
institutional ownership should have, ceteris paribus, higher turnover. The recent work
of Dennis and Strickland (2002) shows that stocks owned by institutions have higher
abnormal turnover on days with big market movements.
23This second kind of externality is present even when there are long term contracts.88 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The presence of noise traders ensures that pA
t <1 and p B
t >
0 for all t. The fund manager of type θ = g will buy as long as
pA
t ≤vt.




2. Similarly, the fact that the good fund manager will sell if he knows that vt = 0
implies that p B
t <
1
2. For a fund manager with θ = b, the expected value of the asset is










PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Given the presence of noise traders, we know that prices
satisfy pA
t < 1, p B
t > 0 for both t = 1 and t = 2. Since there are no career concerns at
t = 2, and because α > 0 it is easy to see that in any equilibrium managers must choose
a2 =s2. Then prices at t =2 are given exactly as in the baseline model, so that expected
returnsgeneratedbythefundmanagerareanincreasingfunctionoftheprincipal’spos-
terior e γ. Thus, as in the baseline model, the investor retains fund managers for whom
the posterior assessment e γ(χ1) > γ. Now consider t = 1 strategies. To begin, notice that
in any equilibrium when α is sufﬁciently small, if
1
2(r(1)+r(−1)) > r(0) fund managers
who do not receive information will churn. Suppose that r(1) ≥ r(0) ≥ r(−1), and that
there is an equilibrium with no churning at t = 1. Consider the payoffs to the informed










2 represents payoff from optimal behavior at t = 2. Notice that π∗
2 ≥ β > 0. For
α > 0, r(1) ≥ r(−1) ⇒ π(a1 = 1) > π(a1 = 0) and r(1) ≥ r(0) ⇒ π(a1 = 1) > π(a1 = ;).
Thus, when v1 = 1 good managers will play a1 = 1. It is easy to check that when v1 = 0,
good managers will play a1 = 0. Thus, good managers always play a1 = s1. Given the
small fringe of naive managers, the investor’s beliefs upon seeing zero return are not
arbitrary. They must (at least) be consistent with the equilibrium behavior of good fund
managers. Thus, upon observing χ1 = 0, the investor knows that the manager cannot
be of type θ = g, and thus optimally, r(0) = 0. Under the maintained hypothesis, this
implies that r(−1) = 0. The two possible cases are r(1) = r(0) = r(−1) = 0 (the manager
is replaced for sure) and r(1) > r(0) = r(−1) = 0. But under any arbitrary mixed strategy
chosenbythebadmanagers,itmustbethecasethat e γ(χ1 >0)>γ. Thus,r(1)=0cannot
be optimal for the investor. Thus, r(1)>0, which implies that
1
2(r(1)+r(−1))>r(0), and
thus non-naive managers of type θ =b will churn. Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 89














Consider the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Suppose that ρg +τg >ρb +τb. It is clear
that in the second period, due to the lack of career concerns, managers set a = s. Let e γ
betheprincipal’sposterior,which,asinthebaselinemodel,issharedbymarketmakers.
Deﬁne




















The expected return generated by the fund manager at t =2 is given by
e ρ(1−pA
2 (e γ))+ e τ(0−pA
2 (e γ))= e ρ−pA




e ρ− e τ
e ρ+ e τ+Nη
,
which is increasing in e γ since e ρ increases in e γ and e τ decreases in e γ. Thus the manager









< γ, and thus r(1) = 1 and r(−1) = 0, reusing the notation
introduced above. Consider e γ(χ1 = 0). Since the only agents who do not trade at t = 1





=Pr(θ = g |χ1 =0)=






Thus, r(0)=0. Therefore r(1)>r(0)=r(−1)=0. It is then immediate that the manager’s
best response is as outlined in the putative equilibrium strategies.
Now suppose that ρg +τg ≤ρb +τb. If the equilibrium strategies are as above, then









< γ, and thus r(1) = 1 and r(−1) = 0. However,




≥ γ, and thus r(0) = 1. Consider the payoffs to a
trader who receives a period 1 signal s = ;. Given the retention probabilities induced
24Note that when we set ρg = 1, and ρb = τg = τb = 0 to return to the baseline model, we get e ρ = e γ and
e τ=0, so that pA
2 (e γ)=
1
2(2e γ+Nη)/(e γ+Nη) exactly as before.90 Dasgupta and Prat Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
by equilibrium behavior, trading without information leads to an expected payoff of β +
1
2β as α → 0, while not trading without information leads to an expected payoff of β +
β. Clearly, then, it is not optimal to churn, and the strategies outlined above cannot
constitute an equilibrium.
Forthesecondpartoftheproposition,supposea2 =s2. Asintheﬁrstpart,theagent













γρg/ρ if χ1 >0
γ(1−ρg −τg)/(1−ρ−τ) if χ1 =0
γτg/τ if χ1 <0.








and e γ(1) > γ: a fund manager who trades correctly is retained. It is then clear that for α
small enough, a fund manager who observes s1 =; prefers to play a1 ={0,1} rather than
a1 =;. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. In the second period, the optimal contract is the ﬂat wage
b2 = (w,w,w). It is the cheapest compensation and induces optimal behavior on the
part of the fund manager (who is indifferent).
If the ﬁrst-period investor offers a ﬂat wage b1 = (w,w,w), it is easy to see that the
continuation equilibrium is as in the statement of the proposition. Following familiar












The ﬂat wage b1 = (w,w,w) offers the lowest compensation; induces the good type
to behave optimally; but induces the bad type to churn. The only way in which the ﬁrst-
period investor can improve his expected payoff is by dissuading a bad fund manager
from churning. The cheapest way to achieve this is to increaseb1(no trade) up to a level




If the fund manager is good, the ﬁrst-period investor’s payoff is now (note that





−w.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Financial equilibrium with career concerns 91
If instead the fund manager is bad, the payoff is just −
3
2w. Hence, the maximum ex-













The difference between the expected payoff with churning and without is



















































which is positive when w ≥γNη/((1+Nη)(γ+Nη)).
The condition imposes a lower bound on w. From the deﬁnition of uC, it is clear
that w ≤
1
2γNη/(1+Nη) for delegation to be optimal. The lower bound must be smaller











which implies that γ+Nη≥2. 
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